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Abstract: Cloud computing is gaining significant attention, 
however, security is the biggest hurdle in its wide acceptance. Users 
of cloud services are under constant fear of data loss, security 
threats and availability issues. Recently, learning-based methods for 
security applications are gaining popularity in the literature with the 
advents in machine learning techniques. However, the major 
challenge in these methods is obtaining real-time and unbiased 
datasets.  Many datasets are internal and cannot be shared due to 
privacy issues or may lack certain statistical characteristics. As a 
result of this, researchers prefer to generate datasets for training 
and testing purpose in the simulated or closed experimental 
environments which may lack comprehensiveness. Machine 
learning models trained with such a single dataset generally result 
in a semantic gap between results and their application. There is a 
dearth of research work which demonstrates the effectiveness of 
these models across multiple datasets obtained in different 
environments. We argue that it is necessary to test the robustness of 
the machine learning models, especially in diversified operating 
conditions, which are prevalent in cloud scenarios. In this work, we 
use the UNSW dataset to train the supervised machine learning 
models. We then test these models with ISOT dataset. We present 
our results and argue that more research in the field of machine 
learning is still required for its applicability to the cloud security.    
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I.Introduction 
 
Recently cloud computing is gaining significant traction and 
virtualized data centers are becoming popular as a cost-
effective infrastructure and solution for enterprise applications. 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) 
and Software as a Service (SaaS) are being widely deployed 
and utilized by the end users. In this way, users neither require 
knowledge, control, and ownership in the computing 
infrastructure nor they need to host, control or own an 
infrastructure in order to deploy their applications. Instead, 
they simply access or rent the hardware or software paying 
only for what they use. The possibility of paying-as-you-go 
along with on-demand elastic operations by cloud hosting 
providers is gaining popularity in enterprise computing model 
[1]. Regardless of its advantages, the transition to this 
computing paradigm is hampered by major security issues, 
which are the subject of many recent studies. Recently there 
has been much interest in Machine Learning (ML) techniques 
for network and cloud security. The fact has been 
demonstrated in the surveys, including one by Tsai et al. [2] 
and Fernandes et al. [3]. These works demonstrate the 
popularity of the machine learning techniques among the 
scholars in the context of cloud and network security.  
The general approach which can be observed towards 
developing ML based security applications is, training the 
models using labeled network traces obtained with some 
experimental environment, with a comprehensive set of 
intrusions and abnormal behavior along with the normal 
behavior [4]. Generally different sets of features are extracted 
from these traces and are used to train the models. A detailed 
description of such features is out of scope of this article and 
readers are advised to refer to works in [8-10] for more details. 
Another portion of the same dataset is then used to test these 
trained models [25, 34].  
This approach itself is a significant challenge and has 
some flaws. Security related datasets are extremely rare, 
mostly due to privacy issues. Hence, machine learning models 
are trained and evaluated over experimentally generated 
datasets that lacks sufficient comprehensiveness [4, 30]. As a 
result of this, models performing well with one particular 
dataset may fail to perform with other datasets. This is due to 
the fact that user packets need to travel through different data 
centers/clouds, distributed across multiple locations operating 
in diversified environments, especially, with the advents of the 
NFV and SFC networking paradigms [36]. Furthermore, most 
learning datasets include only specific types of attacks while 
neglecting others [4, 7]. The authors in [4] argue that the above 
approach severely impairs the evaluation of machine learning 
models, particularly affecting anomaly-based detectors. The 
authors also claim that, “despite the significant contributions of 
DARPA [5] and KDD [6] datasets in the intrusion detection 
domain, their accuracy and ability to reflect real-world 
conditions has been extensively criticized in [7].”  
There is a dearth of research works which focus on 
training and testing of the machine learning models over 
different datasets. This is in fact necessary to test the 
robustness and applicability of the machine learning 
algorithms in real-time scenarios. Addressing this particular 
flaw in recent studies, in this work, we analyze the 
performance of major supervised machine learning algorithms 
with two different datasets, namely,  UNSW [8, 9] and ISOT 
[10]. Both the datasets have been obtained in simulated cloud 
environments. This variety of traffic with two completely 
different datasets serves as a good example of day-to-day use 
of enterprise cloud networks [8, 10]. To be precise, we 
compare regression, decision trees, Naïve Bayes, and Support 
Vector Machines (SVM) techniques. We chose these 
algorithms, as they are widely used in different fields, 
including network and cloud security [12-15, 34].  
First, the models are trained using UNSW training dataset. 
The trained models are then tested using UNSW test and ISOT 
datasets. It is to be noted that UNSW training and test datasets 
are obtained using same experimental environment, however, 
ISOT dataset has been obtained using completely different 
experimental setup (please refer to Section IV for the detailed 
description of the datasets). We argue considering multiple 
datasets will provide the required comprehensiveness in testing  
ML models which has been missing so far in the research 
works [4, 7]. Such testing of the learned models can provide a 
sense of robustness and applicability of the learned models in 
real scenarios. We present our results to demonstrate the need 
for further research in the field of supervised machine learning 
and its applicability to cloud and network security. The rest of 
the paper has been organized as follows. In Section II we 
discuss the state of the art. Section III provides a brief 
description for the datasets under consideration. In Section IV 
we present our findings. Section V finally concludes the paper.  
 
II.Related Work 
 
Cloud security has been studied for a long time in the 
literature. A detailed analysis of the security threats in the 
cloud computing environment is given in [12, 13]. Recently, 
there has been a trend to apply ML techniques for network and 
cloud security as well [14, 15]. For example, SVM based 
approach has been proposed in [16, 17]. Artificial Neural 
Network (ANN) based approach to build the security model 
has been proposed in [18, 19]. Multilayer perceptron (MLP), a 
widely used model has been proposed in [19]. A decision tree 
based approach has been proved to be efficient to detect 
network anomalies [20, 21]. Furthermore, hybrid of two more 
ML models has been studied in the literature as well. Results 
demonstrate the superiority of the hybrid approaches [22].  
A hybrid approach of decision trees and SVM has been 
proposed in [23]. The authors in [24] propose Bayesian 
network based model to detect the network threats. Data 
mining approaches have been proved efficient in [25] for 
anomaly detection in networks. On the other hand, recent 
advances in the computing technologies have aided attackers 
as well. For example, evolution of Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks to Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks [26, 27]. Cloud 
Security Alliance has identified DDoS attack as one of the nine 
major threats [28]. A detailed survey of other possible threats 
in cloud environment and intrusion detection techniques is 
given in [29].  
A common blunder in the anomaly detection works 
discussed so far is the assumption of same operational 
environments. The developed models are trained and tested on 
the datasets obtained within the same experimental setup. 
Generally, packet dumps are captured and some sets of 
features are extracted [25, 34]. The values of these features 
depend on the experimental environment. However, this may 
not be the case in real-time scenarios. Simulated environments 
within the labs are not able to cover all the possible scenarios. 
Moreover, as network behaviors and patterns change, 
intrusions evolve, and new attack types come to evidence. 
Hence, it has become necessary to shift to dynamic learning 
models. In other words, we should consider moving from 
static, sub-optimal and single datasets towards more 
dynamically generated hybrid datasets to reflect the real-time 
traffic conditions. Same fact has been confirmed by [4-7].  
Hence, we argue that machine learning models trained 
with particular datasets need to be tested with completely 
different datasets to test their robustness. In this work, we train 
different supervised machine learning models using the labeled 
UNSW datasets. We then test these models with ISOT dataset 
obtained from completely different experimental setups and 
environments. In the next section, we quickly glance through 
the datasets used in this work.   
 
III.Datasets Description 
 
The UNSW-NB-15 dataset [8] was created using an IXIA 
PerfectStorm tool in the Cyber Range Lab of the Australian 
Centre for Cyber Security (ACCS) to generate a hybrid of the 
realistic modern normal activities and the synthetic 
contemporary attack behaviors from network traffic. A 
tcpdump tool was used to capture 100 GB of a raw network 
traffic. This dataset has nine types of attacks, namely, Fuzzers, 
Analysis, Backdoors, DoS, Exploits, Generic, Reconnaissance, 
Shellcode and Worms. Argus, Bro-IDS network monitoring 
tools are used and twelve algorithms are developed to generate 
totally 49 features with the class label [9]. For more detailed 
description of the features and attack-types, readers are advised 
to read Tables 1 to 5 (Section 2) in [8, 9]. 
Parts of this dataset are configured as training set and 
testing set, namely, “UNSW_NB15_training-set.csv” and 
“UNSW_NB15_testing-set.csv,” respectively, which has been 
used in this work to develop the machine learning models. The 
number of records in the training set is 175,341 records and the 
testing set is 82,332 records. Table I below gives the statistics 
for the anomalous and normal packets in these two datasets.  
Table I: UNSW dataset statistics 
Dataset Total 
Records 
Normal Anomalous 
Training 175342 56000 119341 
Testing 82332 37000 45332 
Total 257674 93000 164674 
Percentages 100% 36.1% 63.9% 
 
ISOT dataset [10] has been obtained from two separate 
datasets containing malicious traffic from the French chapter 
of the Honeynet project involving the Storm and Waledac 
botnets, respectively [31]. In additions, to represent non-
malicious, everyday usage traffic, two different datasets, one 
from the Traffic Lab at Ericsson Research in Hungary [32] and 
the other from the Lawrence Berkeley National Lab (LBNL) 
[33] have been incorporated. The data have been recorded over 
a three month period, from October 2004 to January 2005 
covering 22 subnets. Table II below summarizes the statistics 
for ISOT dataset. In the next section we present our results 
obtained using these two datasets with some major supervised 
machine learning algorithms.  
Table II: ISOT dataset statistics 
Traffic Type Unique Flows Percentages 
Malicious  55904 3.33% 
Normal 1619520 96.66% 
Total 1675424 100% 
 
IV.Results and Analysis 
 
In this section, initially we compare performance of the 
supervised machine learning techniques using UNSW dataset. 
Later on we test the robustness of these learned models with 
ISOT dataset. As mentioned earlier, we have chosen a specific 
algorithm from major supervised machine learning schemes. 
For example, we have chosen J48 from decision trees [23], 
Naïve Bayes from Bayesian networks [24], logistic regression 
from regression techniques (LR) [35] and SVM with three 
different kernels, which are SVM-RBF, SVM-Polynomial, 
SVM-Linear [16, 23]. We chose these algorithms, as they 
represent major supervised schemes and are widely used in 
different areas including network security [34]. Initially we 
train aforementioned supervised machine learning algorithms 
using UNSW training dataset and WEKA tool [11]. Then we 
compare the performance the algorithms over UNSW testing 
dataset. The results are presented below.  
 
Fig. 1: Overall accuracy with UNSW Dataset 
 
Fig. 1 displays the overall performance of the machine 
learning techniques mentioned earlier. We observe that with 
the UNSW training and testing datasets, logistic regression 
performs the best with 89.26% accuracy, followed by J48 
algorithm, with 88.67% accuracy. The polynomial SVM 
algorithm has the least accuracy with 68.06% accuracy. 
However, overall accuracy is not enough to compare the 
performance of these algorithms. It is imperative to observe 
true positive, false positive, true negative and false negative 
rates as well. Table III below explains the meaning of these 
terms in brief. Here zero represents a normal and one 
represents an anomalous packet.  
Table III: Prediction conditions in machine learning 
Total 
Population 
Predicted Condition 
Positive 
(Anomalous) 
Predicted 
Condition 
Negative (Normal) 
Positive (1, 
Anomalous)  
True Positive (TP) False Negative 
(FN) 
Negative (0, 
Normal) 
False Positive (FP) True Negative (TN) 
 
Fig. 2 below shows the TP and FN percentages for these 
algorithms. We observe that logistic regression performs the 
best, with a 93.7 % rate for identifying anomalous packet 
correctly (TP), while it identifies 6.3% of anomalous packets 
as normal (FN), which is an error case. J48 follows with the 
TP and FN percentages as 84.7 and 15.3 respectively. Naïve 
Bayes performs the worst with the percentages as 56.2 and 
43.8 respectively.  
 
Fig. 2: TP and FN rate with UNSW dataset 
 
Fig. 3: TN and FP rate UNSW dataset 
 
 Graphs for TN and FP are displayed in Fig. 3. We observe 
that SVM-RBF performs best with 95.9% accuracy in 
identifying the normal packets correctly (TN) followed by 
linear regression with 95.7%.  Since LR performs the best 
overall, we investigate further with LR to improve its 
performance in identifying the anomalous packets correctly. In 
other words, we aim to increase TP rate for LR, since 
identifying anomalous packets has the highest importance in 
security applications.  
 We extract the parameters for linear regression from the 
model generated by WEKA and implement it separately using 
OCTAVE. We then vary the probability threshold to 
categorize packet as normal versus anomalous packet. By 
default, the value is 0.5, that is, if the final probability for the 
packet being normal is greater than 0.5, then it is classified as 
normal, else it is identified as anomalous. However, in cloud 
security, the major concern is identifying as many anomalous 
packets as possible because the penalty for false negative in 
security is very high. Hence we vary the threshold frequency, 
from 0.1 to 0.9 and plot the graphs for TP and TN. As 
expected, in Fig. 3, with the increase in the threshold, TP rate 
increases, that is percentage for identification of anomalous 
packets increases while that of TN decreases. At threshold 
value 0.7 and 0.8, we observe that TP percentage is around 
97%, which is an accuracy of detecting anomalous packets is 
as high as 97%. Also, accuracy in identifying the normal 
packets (TN) is around 80%, which is acceptable. Hence we 
conclude that the probability threshold can be kept higher than 
0.5, which is around 0.7 to 0.8 to detect anomalous packets 
more accurately.   
 
Fig. 4: Varying Frequency threshold with UNSW dataset 
 
We have obtained satisfactory results with UNSW 
training and testing datasets, however, as mentioned earlier, we 
propose to test the robustness of the models with another 
dataset obtained in a completely different environment. For our 
results, we use ISOT dataset. We chose three techniques, 
which performed best with UNSW dataset that is J48, SVM-
RBF and LR. Fig. 5 shows the overall accuracy of these 
models with the ISOT dataset. As we can see, the overall 
accuracy is still impressive, that is around 95% with J48 and 
LR and around 90% with SVM. In addition, we performed 
similar experiments with LR by varying the threshold to 
increase TP rate and obtained results as shown in Fig. 7. As we 
observe, even at the highest value of threshold at 0.9, the TP 
rate (identifying the anomalous packets) is not more than 54%, 
which is not acceptable. We recall that with the UNSW 
dataset, the value was as high as 97%.  
However, results displayed in Fig. 6 demonstrate that 
the accuracy of these models to detect the anomalous packet 
have deteriorated. For example, the highest accuracy for TP is 
around 43%, which is very low as compared against the one in 
Fig. 2 which is 93.7%. Such a low accuracy in identifying the 
anomalous packets may prove disastrous in real-time 
scenarios. This is a significant evidence that the models trained 
and tested with data from one single environment may not 
perform well with other datasets in the network or cloud 
security scenario.  
 
Fig. 5: Overall accuracy with ISOT Dataset 
 
Fig. 6: TP and TN rate with ISOT dataset 
 
Fig. 7: Varying Frequency threshold with ISOT dataset 
 
This may happen due to different network settings or new 
attack behavior that was not considered in the training dataset. 
Moreover, this may be a result of the fact that supervised 
machine learning techniques performs well with a large 
number of positive (1) as well as negative (0) samples in the 
training dataset. However, this may not be the case with 
anomaly detection, where anomalous events are rare and have 
a very small number of positive samples [34]. With the help of 
the results we argue that more research needs to be carried out 
in the domain of machine learning as far as network and cloud 
security is concerned. It may include exploring the 
unsupervised machine learning techniques or exploring 
clustering and other related techniques for anomaly detection. 
 
V.Conclusions 
 
Our work focuses on the imbalance between the extensive 
amount of research on supervised ML techniques and their 
applicability to the real-time scenarios. With reference to the 
above results, we conclude that the supervised machine 
learning models that perform well with a particular dataset, 
may or may not perform satisfactory with totally different 
datasets generated with different simulation or experimental 
conditions and environments. In addition, a single dataset can’t 
include all types of attacks. This is a prevalent condition in the 
cloud scenarios, especially with the advent in the new 
networking paradigms such as Network Function 
Virtualization (NFV) and Service Function Chaining (SFC), 
where packets need to travel more than one datacenter and/or 
clouds, operating in different conditions. Hence we conclude 
that, supervised ML techniques need significant rework to 
perform better in the context of cloud security. More research 
is needed in the areas such as anomaly detection, clustering 
and/or unsupervised machine learning in the future.  
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